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Abstract
After considering the evolution and scope of the capital movement rules, this Article will ex-
amine two distinct themes: 1) the treatment of discriminatory taxation under the capital movement
rules, looking in particular at whether there is a coherent approach to this issue across the Treaty
“freedoms,” and 2) the reaction of the European Court to the extension of the capital movement
rules to third countries.
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INTRODUCTION
The free movement of capital is the only "freedom" under
the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty")
where the original Treaty rules have been repealed and re-
placed. The original provisions were also unique in being so
drafted as to be held incapable of giving rise to rights enforcea-
ble by individuals before their national courts, so that liberaliza-
tion of capital movements within the European Community
("EC") was eventually achieved in 1990, more than twenty years
late, by virtue of a series of Council Directives. The Maastricht
Treaty, which set out the institutional provisions relating to Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union, introduced new capital movement
provisions which entered into force on January 1, 1994 (the start
of the second stage of Economic and Monetary Union). While,
like the other freedoms, these rules are capable of direct effect,
they are distinctive in two other ways: they in principle extend to
movements to and from third countries as well as to movements
within the EC, but on the other hand they appear to allow for a
degree of differential tax treatment on the basis of residence or
place of investment. Further complications arise from the fact
that the European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court of Justice")
has consistently held that the definitions of capital movements
set out in the last of the old Directives-definitions which ap-
pear to overlap with freedom of establishment and freedom to
provide services-should be applied in the context of the cur-
rent rules. After considering the evolution and scope of the cap-
ital movement rules, this Article will examine two distinct
themes: 1) the treatment of discriminatory taxation under the
capital movement rules, looking in particular at whether there is
a coherent approach to this issue across the Treaty "freedoms,"
and 2) the reaction of the European Court to the extension of
the capital movement rules to third countries.
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I. THE ORIGINAL TREATY RULES ON
FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
The basic requirement set out in Article 67(1) of the origi-
nal Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
("EEC Treaty") was that during the transitional period, Member
States should progressively abolish between themselves all re-
strictions on the movement of capital belonging to persons resi-
dent in Member States and any discrimination based on the na-
tionality or on the place of residence of the parties or on the
place where such capital is invested, but only "to the extent nec-
essary to ensure the proper functioning of the common mar-
ket."' With regard to transitional and standstill arrangements,
the original Article 68(1) required Member States to be "as lib-
eral as possible" in granting such exchange authorizations as
were still necessary after the entry into force of the Treaty.2 Ad-
ditionally, the original Article 71 required Member States to "en-
deavour to avoid introducing within the Community any new ex-
change restrictions on the movement of capital and current pay-
ments connected with such movements, and to endeavour not to
make existing rules more restrictive."3
Briefly summarizing the remainder of the original version
of the Title, Article 69 enabled the Council to issue directives for
the implementation of Article 67, acting by a qualified majority
from the beginning of the third stage (i.e. January 1, 1966). Ar-
ticles 70 and 72 dealt with the question of capital movements
between Member States and third countries, and Article 73 ena-
bled protective measures to be authorized by the Commission
or, under Article 73(2), to be taken by the Member State itself in
case of urgency.
The legal effects of Article 67 of the original version of the
EEC Treaty were considered by the European Court in Criminal
Proceedings Against Guerrno Casati.4 It has been seen that Article
67 differed from the other freedoms laid down by the Treaty in
that it was not drafted in absolute terms. It does not require
restrictions on the movement of capital simply to be abolished;
1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community art. 67(1), Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. Id. art. 68(1).
3. Id. art. 71.
4. See Criminal Proceedings Against Guerrno Casati, Case 203/80, [1981] E.C.R. I-
2595.
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rather it requires them to be abolished "to the extent necessary
to ensure the proper functioning of the common market." In
Casati it was held that the scope of that restriction might vary in
time and depended on an assessment of the requirements of the
common market and on an appraisal of both the advantages and
risks which liberalization might entail. It was further stated that
such an assessment was "first and foremost" a matter for the
Council, and that the obligation to abolish restrictions on move-
ments of capital could not be separated from the Council's as-
sessment of the need to liberalize the category of transactions in
question.
In other words, it was not a straightforward rule which a na-
tional court, or even the Court of Justice, could apply directly,
but essentially a question of policy for the Council, being that
the role of the Court is limited to checking whether the Council
had overstepped the limits of its discretion. The Court con-
cluded that there was no reason to suppose that, by taking the
view at that stage it was unnecessary to liberalize the exportation
of banknotes, the Council had in fact overstepped those limits.
With regard to the "standstill" provision in the original Arti-
cle 71, the Court again noted that by stating that Member States
"shall endeavour" to avoid introducing within the Community
any new exchange restrictions on the movement of capital and
current payments connected with such movements, and shall
"endeavour" not to make existing rules more restrictive, the
wording of that provision departed noticeably from the more im-
perative forms of wording used in the other Treaty freedoms,
and did not impose on Member States an unconditional obliga-
tion capable of being relied on by individuals.
II. THE CAPITAL MOVEMENT DIRECTIVES
Although the original Treaty provisions themselves may not
have been capable of giving rise to rights enforceable by individ-
uals, the first Council Directive under the original Article 67 was
enacted during the first stage of the original transitional period
on May 11, 1960,' and was amended by Directive 63/21 at the
end of 1962.6 It may be observed that in their recitals, these Di-
5. See generally Council Directive, First Directive for the Implementation of Article
67 of the Treaty, O.J. 43/921 (1960).
6. See generally Council Directive No. 63/21, O.J. 9/62 (1963).
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rectives claim to be made under a number of Treaty provisions,
including not only Articles 67 and 69 on capital movements but
also the former Article 106(2) on current payments. The basic
pattern established by these Directives was to divide capital
movements into four lists, with different degrees of liberaliza-
tion. Member States were required to grant "all foreign ex-
change authorisations" for the transactions or transfers set out in
List A, which included direct investments (defined so as to ex-
clude purely financial investments) in an undertaking in an-
other Member State, investments in real estate, certain personal
capital movements, short (one year) and medium-term (one to
five year) credits related to commercial transactions or provision
of services, death duties, and damages to the extent they may be
regarded as capital. 7 List A also included transfers in perform-
ance of insurance contracts "as and when free movement in re-
spect of services"8 was extended to them, authors' royalties and
"transfers of moneys required for the provision of services,"
which would appear clearly to involve current payments rather
than capital movements.9
The transactions and transfers in List B had to be granted
"general permission" by the Member States.1" List B largely con-
sisted of various operations in securities, notably acquisition and
liquidation by non-residents of domestic listed securities, and ac-
quisition and liquidation by residents of foreign listed securities.
On the other hand, while the transactions and transfers in List C
had to receive foreign exchange authorizations in principle,
Member States could maintain or reintroduce the exchange re-
strictions which were operative at the date of entry into force of
the Directive where such free movement of capital might form
an obstacle to the achievement of the economic policy objectives
7. See Council Directive, First Directive for the Implementation of Article 67 of the
Treaty, List A, O.J. 43/921 (1960); see also Council Directive 63/474/EEC of July 30
1963 Liberalising Transfers in Respect of Invisible Transactions Not Connected with the
Movement of Goods, Services, Capital or Persons, Annex, OJ. 125/2240 (1963) (ad-
dressing invisible transactions, which included damages which could not be considered
as capital).
8. Council Directive, First Directive for the Implementation of Article 67 of the
Treaty, List A, O.J. 43/921 (1960).
9. Council Directive No. 63/21/EEC, List A, O.J. 9/62 (1962) (amending the First
Directive for the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty).
10. Id. at List B. Although it is only of historic interest, it might be argued that
"general permission" was in fact a wider-ranging obligation than granting "all foreign
exchange authorizations" under List A.
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of the Member State concerned. List C included the issue and
placing of securities of a domestic undertaking on a foreign capi-
tal market and of a foreign undertaking on the domestic capital
market, cross-border acquisitions and liquidations of units in
unit trusts, and the granting and repayment of certain long-term
credits. Finally, List D set out the capital movements which did
not have to be liberalized, including in particular the opening
and the placing of funds on current or deposit accounts, and the
physical import and export of financial assets and personal
loans.
In 1986, this framework was amended by Directive 86/566,11
which in effect merged the old lists A and B from the earlier
Directives into a new List A, and added certain other elements to
those lists from the former List C, notably the issue and placing
of securities of a domestic undertaking on a foreign capital mar-
ket and of a foreign undertaking on the domestic capital market,
cross-border acquisitions and liquidations of units in unit trusts,
and the granting and repayment of certain long-term credits
noted above. What was left of List C was renamed List B, still
subject to the power of the Member States to maintain or rein-
troduce the exchange restrictions which were operative at the
date of entry into force of the Directive where free movement of
capital might form an obstacle to the achievement of the eco-
nomic policy objectives of the Member State concerned. List C
also included transactions in unlisted securities, medium and
long-term loans and credits not connected with commercial
transactions or provision of services, and sureties and guarantees
relating thereto. Finally, the old List D became List C, but still
not liberalized.
A new approach was followed by Directive 88/361,12 which
finally established the basic principle of free movement of capi-
tal as a matter of Community law with effect, for most Member
States, from July 1, 1990. Free movement of capital thus became
the only Treaty "freedom" to be achieved in the manner envis-
aged in the Treaty-by the enactment of a programme of legisla-
tion-albeit twenty years after the time limit envisaged in the
Treaty. Subject to its other provisions, Article 1(1) of the 1988
Directive provided that "Member States shall abolish restrictions
11. Council Directive No. 86/566, O.J. L 332/22 (1986).
12. Council Directive No. 88/361, O.J. L 178/5 (1988).
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on movements of capital taking place between persons resident
in Member States" and although there was still a nomenclature
of capital movements annexed to the Directive, it was stated to
be to facilitate its application, rather than to introduce distinc-
tions in treatment.13 Annex I itself stated that the nomenclature
was not intended to be an exhaustive list of the notion of capital
movements, and it should not be interpreted as restricting the
scope of the principle of full liberalization of capital movements
in Article 1. However, in the absence of a Treaty definition, the
headings of the nomenclature (which in reality owe much to the
previous lists) indicate the concept of capital underlying the Di-
rective: direct investments, investments in real estate, operations
in securities normally dealt in on the capital market, operations
in units of collective investment undertakings, operations in se-
curities and other instruments normally dealt in on the money
market, operations in current and deposit accounts with finan-
cial institutions, credits related to commercial transactions or to
the provision of services in which a resident is participating, fi-
nancial loans and credits, sureties, other guarantees and rights
of pledge, transfers in performance of insurance contracts, per-
sonal capital movements, physical import and export of financial
assets, and "other capital movements" (defined so as to include
transfers of the moneys required for the provision of services).
The introduction to the Annex further states that the capi-
tal movements mentioned are taken to cover all the operations
necessary for the purposes of capital movements, i.e. the conclu-
sion and performance of the transaction and related transfers,
and should also include access for the economic operator to all
the financial techniques available on the market approached for
the purpose of carrying out the operation in question.
Many of the movements listed were thus clearly current pay-
ments relating to other freedoms under what was then Article
106(1)-which will be discussed in the next section of this pa-
per-even though the Court had clearly held in the joined cases
of Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro that Article 106(1) was
directly effective.14 At first sight, it might seem that to include
such movements in the Directive was superfluous. However, it
13. Id. art. 1(1), O.J. L 178/5 (1988).
14. Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro,Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, [1984]
E.C.R. 1-377, 37.
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might be suggested that the difficulties in distinguishing clearly
between capital movements and current payments, and the nar-
row way in which the Court read Article 106 in Criminal Proceed-
ings Against R. Lambert, holding that it was not relevant to the way
an exporter received payment, merely being concerned to ensure
that the importer was able to make the payment, and that it enti-
tled the exporter only to payment in his own currency, meant
that there was some practical advantage in including what were
possibly current payments within the concept of liberalized capi-
tal movements." Be that as it may, a problem which continues
to be of relevance is that several of these definitions overlap with
other "freedoms": thus "direct investments" includes "establish-
ment and extension of branches or new undertakings belonging
solely to the person providing the capital," which clearly also
constitutes the exercise of freedom of establishment, and it may
be suggested that the operation of current and deposit accounts,
and loans, credits and sureties all involve the provision of ser-
vices, to give a few examples.
III. PAYMENTS RELATING TO OTHER TREATY FREEDOMS
It is self evident that the free movement of goods would be
nugatory if a purchaser in one Member State was not able to pay
a supplier in another Member State, and the same holds true for
the other Treaty "freedoms." 6 This was expressly recognized in
Article 106 of the EEC Treaty as originally drafted, which was
continued until January 1994 as Article 73h EC by virtue of the
Maastricht amendments. Under paragraph 1 of this provision,
each Member State undertook to authorize, in the currency of
the Member State in which the creditor or the beneficiary re-
sided, any payment connected with the movement of goods, ser-
vices or capital, and any transfers of capital and earnings, to the
extent that the movement of goods, services, capital and persons
between Member States had been liberalized pursuant to the
Treaty. The second paragraph further specified that in so far as
movement of goods, services and capital were limited only by
15. See Criminal Proceedings Against R. Lambert, Case 308/86, [1988] E.C.R. I-
4369.
16. Although conversely, a restriction on the freedom to provide services, justified
in the general good, may also justify a restriction on correlative monetary movements.
See Vereniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media, Case C-
148/91, [1993] E.C.R. 1-487.
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restrictions on payments connected therewith, these restrictions
should be progressively abolished by applying, mutatis mutandis,
the provisions of the Chapters relating to the abolition of quanti-
tative restrictions, to the liberalization of services and to the free
movement of capital; and under the third paragraph, Member
States undertook not to introduce between themselves any new
restrictions on transfers connected with invisible transactions,
and agreed that the progressive abolition of existing restrictions
should be effected in accordance with the general programme
on freedom to provide services in so far as such abolition was not
governed by the provisions contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 or
by the other provisions of the Chapter on the free movement of
capital.
The first paragraph was of particular importance in that it
was held to be directly effective, giving rise to rights enforceable
by individuals before their national courts, at a time when the
Treaty rules on free movement of capital did not give rise to
such rights.17 This was established in Luisi & Carbonell in rela-
tion to Italian residents who had acquired more than the permit-
ted amount of foreign currency, claiming it was to pay for vari-
ous services in France and Germany. Under the capital move-
ments directives then in force, there was no requirement to
liberalize the physical transfer of banknotes, but the original Ar-
ticle 106 did require current payments relating to other Treaty
freedoms to be authorized in the creditor's currency.1 9 The
Court noted that the Treaty did not define what was meant by
movements of capital, and held that it was not necessarily the
case that any physical transfer of financial assets constituted a
movement of capital. After comparing the original Articles 67
and 106, the Court concluded that current payments are trans-
fers of foreign exchange which constitute the consideration
within the context of an underlying transaction, whilst move-
ments of capital are financial operations essentially concerned
17. See Criminal Proceedings Against Guerrino Casati, Case 203/80, [1981] E.C.R.
1-2595.
18. See generally Luisi & Carbone, [1984] E.C.R. 1-377.
19. Even if Directive 63/340 on the abolition of all prohibitions on or obstacles to
payments for services where the only restrictions on exchange of services are those gov-
erning such services made under Article 106(2) expressly excluded services in connec-
tion with transport and foreign exchange allowances for tourists. See Council Directive
No. 63/340, O.J. L 86/1609 (1963).
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with the investment of the funds in question rather than remu-
neration for a service, noting that the original Article 67(2) of
the Treaty recognized that there could be current payments con-
nected with the movement of capital. It was therefore held that
the physical transfer of banknotes could not be classified as a
movement of capital where the transfer in question corre-
sponded to an obligation to pay arising from a transaction in-
volving the movement of goods or services.
While this distinction between the consideration and the
underlying transaction may seem clear, it does give rise to practi-
cal difficulties. To take the simple example of a with-profits life
assurance policy, part of the premium will be used for invest-
ment purposes (presumably "capital" in the Court's definition),
and part will be used to meet expenses and to pay for the life
assurance (presumably both payments for services). Although
the Court endeavoured to state that there was a clear distinction
between movements of capital and current payments, it remains
the case that the series of directives on the free movement of
capital enacted under the original Article 67 of the Treaty ap-
pear to have covered both types of transactions,20 although, in-
triguingly, they required transfers in respect to capital move-
ments to be made on the same exchange rate conditions as
those governing payments relating to current transactions, a ter-
minology which appeared to recognize that there were two dif-
ferent concepts. In the version resulting from Directive 86/
566,21 to take a historic example, list A, which was a list of trans-
actions which had to be liberalized, expressly included transfers
in performance of insurance contracts "as and when free move-
ment in respect of services" was extended to them. Indeed, list A
did actually expressly include transfers of monies required for
the provision of services, which was a clear overlap with the con-
cept of current payments enounced in Luisi & Carbone, and this
terminology has been carried over into the nomenclature of cap-
ital movements annexed to the 1988 Directive.
With regard to the currency in which payment may be
made, the Court of Justice applied a restrictive literal approach
20. Council Directive No. 88/361, O.J. L 178/5 (1988).
21. Council Directive No. 85/566, O.J. L 332/22 (1986).
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to the old Article 106 in Criminal Proceedings Against R Lambert,22
holding that it was not relevant to the way an exporter received
payment, merely being concerned to ensure that the importer was
able to make the payment. But it may be suggested that both
aspects are equally important to the achievement of the genuine
free movement of goods and services, and that this judgment
takes an unduly narrow approach. It had, however, been noted
by the Court in Luisi & Carbone that the original Article 106 only
applied to liberalize current payments made in the currency of
the state of the creditor, which helps explain the decision in
Casati, since in that case Article 106 would only have justified
payment in lire.
Indeed it may be suggested that the substantive Treaty pro-
visions relating to the "freedom" at issue may themselves have a
wider scope: a hindrance on the payment for goods imported
from another Member State may amount to a restriction on the
free movement of those goods. The matter came to light in the
case of Commission v. Italy,23 in relation to an import deposit
scheme. Under Italian law, in order to deter currency specula-
tion, importers paying for goods in advance of their release from
customs clearance had to lodge an interest-free security or guar-
antee. The Court found that although the measures in question
were enacted for the purpose of preventing currency specula-
tion, they were not specific rules for the attainment of that objec-
tive but general rules which affected normal commercial transac-
tions where payment was made in advance. Since they were un-
deniably a hindrance to trade, the Italian rules were classified as
measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions. The Italian gov-
ernment next argued that these measures could be justified
under Article 30 (then Article 36) EC on grounds of public pol-
icy, since they had as their objective the safeguarding of a funda-
mental interest of the State, the defense of its currency. But the
Court, following well-established case law, reaffirmed that Article
30 applied only to matters of a non-economic nature.
The Italian government had also, in effect, argued that the
rules at issue were a matter of monetary policy, and therefore
could not be subject to the rules on the free movement of goods.
22. See Criminal Proceedings Against R. Lambert, Case 308/86, [1988] E.C.R.
4369.
23. Commission v. Italy, Case 95/81, [1982] E.C.R. 2187, 11.
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The Court pointed out, however, that the Treaty contained spe-
cific provisions (then Articles 108 and 109, now Articles 119 and
120) allowing for protective measures to counter difficulties in
the balance of payments, and concluded that the requirement in
the then Article 104 that each Member State should pursue the
economic policy needed to ensure the equilibrium of its overall
balance of payments and to maintain confidence in its currency
did not of itself permit derogations from the free movement of
goods.
IV. THE CURRENT RULES
The Treaty on European Union introduced new provisions
on "capital and payments" with effect from January 1, 1994, the
date set for the start of the second stage of Economic and Mone-
tary Union. The fundamental rules are set out in paragraph 1 of
Article 56 of the EC Treaty, which states that "[w]ithin the
framework of the provisions set out in [that] Chapter, all restric-
tions on the movement of capital between Member States and
between Member States and third countries shall be prohibited;"
paragraph 2 states that within the same framework, "all restric-
tions on payments between Member States and between Mem-
ber States and third countries shall be prohibited. 24
At first sight, a fundamental distinction between these provi-
sions and the original provisions-and indeed from the situation
reached under the 1988 Directive-is that it appears that move-
ments to and from third countries are to be treated the same way
as movements between Member States. With hindsight, this can
be seen as anticipating the need to reassure the international
money markets with regard to the external movement and avail-
ability of the euro. However, in reality, there are differences
which remain, and this issue will be discussed further in the final
section of this Article.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that free movement of capital
rules now apply to movements into and out of the Community,
the 1988 definitions drafted to cover movements within the
Community continue to be used. This was made clear when the
Court confirmed that a mortgage fell within the scope of a capi-
tal movement as defined in the Directive in the case of Trummer
24. Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community art.
56, O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/63 (2006) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
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v. Meyer, 2 and further held that this interpretation should con-
tinue to apply to the free movement of capital under Article 56.
The present author suggested in 1994 that in the continued si-
lence of the Treaty, the Annex to the Directive remained a use-
ful source of illustration of the principle of the free movement
of capital even after the entry into force of Article 56 to Article
60 under the Maastricht Treaty.26 Such a view had in fact been
accepted by the Austrian Landesgericht in Trummer v. Mayer, but
the Landesgericht interpreted the Annex so as not to cover the
transaction in question. For its part, the Court of Justice took
the view that Article 56 "substantially reproduces the contents of
Article 1 of Directive 88/361" and held that:
[T] he nomenclature in respect of movements of capital An-
nexed to Directive 88/361 still has the same indicative value,
for the purposes of defining the notion of capital movements,
as it did before the entry into force of Article [56] et seq.,
subject to the qualification, contained in the introduction to
the nomenclature, that the list set out therein is not exhaus-
tive.27
The Court had in fact already held, in Svensson & Gustavsson v.
Ministre du Logement, that borrowing money from a bank in an-
other Member State to buy a house fell within the scope of the
Directive.28 Though it was subsequently suggested by Advocate-
General Tesauro, in his Opinion in Safir v. Skattemyndigheten i
Dalamas Lan, that a narrower concept of capital movements
should be adopted, the Court confirmed in Trummer v. Mayer
that a mortgage fell within the scope of a capital movement as
defined in the Directive. More specifically, it was held both that
the mortgage in this case was inextricably linked to a capital
movement-the liquidation of an investment in real prop-
erty2 9-and that the mortgage as such was a capital movement
under Point IX of the nomenclature as an "other guarantee"
under the heading "sureties, other guarantees and rights of
pledge." In those circumstances, the Court held that an obliga-
25. See generally Trummer v. Mayer, Case C-222/97, [1999] E.C.R. 1-1661.
26. SeeJOHN USHER, THE LAW OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNrTY 19 (1994).
27. See Trummer, [1999] E.C.R. 1-1661, 21.
28. See generally Svensson & Gustavsson v. Ministre du Logement, Case C-484/93,
[1995] E.C.R. 1-3955.
29. See Council Directive No. 88/361, Annex I, O.J. L 178/5, at 11 (1988).
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tion to have recourse to the national currency for the purposes
of creating a mortgage must be regarded, in principle, as a re-
striction on the free movement of capital within the meaning of
Article 56 of the EC Treaty.
However, there has been a lack of consistency in determin-
ing whether an activity falling within the lists in the Annex to the
Directive should be categorized as a capital movement or as fall-
ing within the scope of another "freedom." In Criminal Proceed-
ings Against Andre Ambiy,30 it was held that for France to require
the compulsory financial security provided by a travel agent to
be guaranteed by a credit institution or insurance company situ-
ated in France breached the Treaty rules on freedom to provide
services-although it may be observed that the list in the Annex
to the 1988 Capital Movements Directive expressly includes guar-
antees granted by non-residents to residents."1 Nevertheless, in
Commission v. Italy,32 it was held that an Italian requirement that
undertakings engaged in the provision of temporary labor estab-
lished in other Member States had to lodge a guarantee with a
credit institution having its registered office or a branch office in
Italy was a breach both of the freedom to provide services under
Article 49 and of the free movement of capital under Article 56;
it was held to restrict the free movement of capital on the basis
that under point IX of Annex I to Directive 88/361, guarantees
granted by non-residents to residents or by residents to non-re-
sidents constitute movements of capital, which should therefore
be liberalized under Article 56(1).
A similar potential for overlap may also be seen in the rela-
tionship between free movement of capital and freedom of es-
tablishment: in Staatssecretaris van Financign v. B. G.M. Verkooijen33
receipt by a resident of one Member State of dividends on shares
in a company whose seat was in another Member State was
treated as free movement of capital falling under Directive 88/
361, whereas in Metallgesellschaft & Hoechst v. Inland Revenue &
30. Criminal Proceedings Against Andre Ambry, Case C-410/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-
7875.
31. See Council Directive No. 88/361, Annex I, Oj. L 178/5, at IX(A) (1988).
32. See generally Commission v. Italy, Case C-279/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-1425.
33. See generally Staatssecretaris van Financidn v. B.G.M. Verkooijen (Verkooijen),
Case C-35-98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4071.
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H.M. Attorney General,34 the payment of dividends by a subsidiary
company to a parent company resident in another Member State
was treated as a question of freedom of establishment. Similarly,
in N. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Qost/kantoor Almelo, 5 N.
moved from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom, which
constituted a notional (and taxable) disposal of his shares under
Dutch law. Since it was a substantial shareholding it was held to
fall under the establishment rules-yet the Explanatory Notes to
the Annex to the 1988 Directive state that "direct investments"
under the Directive include:
[I] nvestments of all kinds by natural persons or commercial,
industrial or financial undertakings, and which serve to estab-
lish or maintain lasting and direct links between the person
providing the capital and the entrepreneur to whom or the
undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to
carry on an economic activity."
Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber stated in Test Claimants in the
Thin Cap Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue that:
[N]ational provisions which apply to holdings by nationals of
the Member State concerned in the capital of a company es-
tablished in another Member State, giving them definite in-
fluence on the company's decisions and allowing them to de-
termine its activities, come within the substantive scope of the
provisions of the EC Treaty on freedom of establishment.
3 7
Yet, in Commission v. Germany,38 concerned with "golden shares"
in Volkswagen, the Grand Chamber referred to the nomencla-
ture Annexed to the 1988 Directive, and declared that:
[M]ovements of capital within the meaning of Article 56(1)
EC . . . include direct investments, that is to say, as that no-
menclature and the related explanatory notes show, invest-
ments of any kind undertaken by natural or legal persons and
which serve to establish or maintain lasting and direct links
between the persons providing the capital and the undertak-
34. See generally Metallgesellschaft & Hoechst v. Inland Revenue & H.M. Attorney
Gen.,Joined Cases C-397/98 & C-410/98, [2001] E.C.R. 1-1727.
35. Seegenerally N. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo, Case
C-470/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-7409.
36. Council Directive No. 88/361, Explanatory Notes, O.J. L 178/5 (1988).
37. See generally Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland
Revenue, C-524/04, [2007] E.C.R. 1-2107, 27.
38. See Commission v. Germany, Case C-112/05, [2007] E.C.R. - (ECJ Oct. 23,
2007) (LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Cases File).
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ings to which that capital is made available in order to carry
out an economic activity.39
Furthermore, "shareholdings in new or existing undertakings, as
those explanatory notes confirm, the objective of establishing or
maintaining lasting economic links presupposes that the shares
held by the shareholder enable him ... to participate effectively
in the management of that company or in its control."4 ° The
Grand Chamber therefore concluded that measures which were
liable to deter such investment constituted a restriction on the
free movement of capital.
Indeed, the broad use of the capital movement rules to deal
with issues which might be thought to involve questions of free-
dom of establishment is very clearly shown in the series of deci-
sions in relation to "golden shares,"41 where measures designed
to enable the public authorities to limit the size of shareholdings
or restrict the disposal of assets in privatized companies were
held to amount to restrictions on investment in breach of the
rules on the free movement of capital. Recent examples include
the 2005 case of Commission v. Italy,4 2 which involved Italian rules
suspending voting rights attributed to shareholdings greater
than two percent of the capital of companies in the electricity
and gas sectors held by public undertakings. This was held to
breach the capital movement rules in that it excluded these pub-
lic undertakings from participating effectively in the manage-
ment and control of Italian gas and electricity undertakings.
Similarly in Commission v. Netherlands,43 special shares held by the
Netherlands State in privatized undertakings giving it special
rights to approve certain management decisions were held to
breach the capital movement rules.
A particularly striking example is the recent decision involv-
ing the 1960 privatization legislation governing the Volkswagen
39. Id. 118.
40. Id.
41. See Commission v. United Kingdom, Case C-98/01, [2003] E.C.R. 1-4641; Com-
mission v. France, Case C-483/99, [2002] E.C.R. 1-4781; Commission v. Portugal, Case
C-367/98, [2002] E.C.R. 14731; Commission v. Belgium, Case C-503/99, [2002] E.C.R.
1-4809.
42. See generally Commission v. Italy, Case C-174/04, [2005] E.C.R. 1-4933.
43. See generally Commission v. Netherlands, Joined Cases C-282/04 & C-283/04,
[2006] E.C.R. 1-9141.
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company. 44 This involved limiting, in derogation from the gen-
eral law, the voting rights of every shareholder to twenty percent
of Volkswagen's share capital; secondly, it required a majority of
over eighty percent of the shares represented for resolutions of
the general assembly, which, according to the general law, re-
quired only a majority of seventy-five percent; and thirdly, in der-
ogation from the general law, it enabled the Federal State and
the Land of Lower Saxony each to appoint two representatives to
the company's supervisory board. The Commission brought its
action on the basis that these provisions were liable to deter di-
rect investment and for that reason constituted restrictions on
the free movement of capital within the meaning of Article 56
EC. In its judgment, the Grand Chamber noted that the Land of
Lower Saxony, for its part, still retained an interest in the region
of twenty percent, so that the Volkswagen Law thus created an
instrument enabling the Land authorities to procure for them-
selves a blocking minority allowing them to oppose important
resolutions, on the basis of a lower level of investment than
would be required under general company law, and that by cap-
ping voting rights at the same level of twenty percent, the Volk-
swagen Law supplemented a legal framework which enabled the
Land authorities to exercise considerable influence on the basis
of such a reduced investment. It concluded that this situation
was liable to deter direct investors from other Member States,
holding that this finding could not be undermined by the argu-
ment advanced by the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect
that Volkswagen's shares are among the most highly-traded in
Europe and that a large number of them are in the hands of
investors from other Member States. It was further found that
the right of the Federal State and the Land to appoint two repre-
sentatives each on the supervisory board enabled them to partici-
pate in a more significant manner in the activity of the supervi-
sory board than their status as shareholders would normally al-
low, and that therefore the influence of the other shareholders
might be reduced below a level commensurate with their own
levels of investment. The conclusion, therefore, was that by re-
stricting the possibility for other shareholders to participate in
the company with a view to establishing or maintaining lasting
44. Commission v. Germany, Case C-112/05, [2007] E.C.R. __ (ECJ Oct. 23,
2007) (LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Cases File).
2008] EVOLUTION OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL 1549
and direct economic links with it such as to enable them to par-
ticipate effectively in the management of that company or in its
control, the Volkswagen Law is liable to deter direct investors
from other Member States from investing in the company's capi-
tal-which brings us back to the debate about the dividing line
between free movement of capital and freedom of establish-
ment.
V. THE TAX ISSUE
At first sight, Article 58(1) (a) EC appears to allow certain
forms of tax discrimination, leading to a possible negative result
from classifying an operation as a capital movement. It states
that the provisions of Article 56 (i.e. the liberalization of capital
movements and payments inside and outside the Community):
[S]hall be without prejudice to the right of Member States:
(a) to apply the relevant provision of their tax law which dis-
tinguish between tax-payers who are not in the same situation
with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the
place where their capital is invested; .. .
This appears to be a clear authorization to discriminate in the
tax system between residents and non-residents, and no doubt
reflects the fact that residence is widely used to determine the
national legislation to which a taxpayer is subject. It could how-
ever allow discrimination against non-residents, and against
those investing in other Member States, which could clearly con-
flict with the fundamental Treaty freedoms relating to establish-
ment, provision of services and movement of workers. Neverthe-
less, Article 58(1) (a) is subject both to the caveat in Article 58(3)
that such measures shall not constitute a means of arbitrary dis-
crimination or a disguised restriction on the free movement of
capital and payments as defined in Article 56 and to a Declara-
tion made by the Member States when the Maastricht Treaty was
signed, stating that:
The Conference affirms that the right of Member States to
apply the relevant provisions of their tax law as referred to in
[Article 58 (1) (a) ] of this Treaty will apply only with respect to
the relevant provisions which exist at the end of 1993. How-
ever, this Declaration shall apply only to capital movements
between Member States and to payments effected between
45. EC Treaty, supra note 25, art. 58(1)(a), OJ. C 321 E/37, at E/64.
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Member States. 6
It may be suggested that this at the least amounted to a political
commitment not to introduce any new measures of the type at
issue in the context of monetary movements between Member
States. Be that as it may, the classification as a capital movement
of an economic activity which could be regarded as involving
freedom of establishment or freedom to provide services has the
potential to give rise to awkward tax questions, and further
problems might be thought to arise from Article 50 EC (stating
that services are only "services" if they do not fall under one of
the other freedoms) and Article 51 EC (subordinating banking
and insurance services to the liberalization of the movement of
capital).
While it may be wondered how the wording of Article
58(1) (a) may be reconciled with the concept of a single market
for financial services, and more particularly how it may be recon-
ciled with the principle of non-discrimination underlying the
Treaty provisions on free movement of persons and provision of
services, it was made clear in 2004, in the case of Petri Man-
ninen,47 that the prohibition of arbitrary discrimination in Arti-
cle 58(3) enables Article 58(1) (a) to be interpreted in line with
the case-law on tax discrimination under the other Treaty free-
doms. Before that decision, however, various other approaches
had been suggested. The most straightforward was to argue that
Article 58(1) (a) is only concerned with monetary movements as
such,48 and that it does not apply to situations governed by the
other Treaty freedoms. It may be submitted, however, that this
straightforward approach does not appear to take account of Ar-
ticles 50 and 51 of the Treaty mentioned above. However, while
it had long been assumed that the effect of Articles 50 and 51
was to make services a residual concept, the Court took a differ-
ent view in Safir v. Skattemyndigheten i Dalarnas Lan.49 It was there
46. Treaty on European Union, Declaration on Article 73d of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community, O.J. C 191 (1992).
47. See generally Petri Manninen, Case C-319/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-7477.
48. See Frans Vanistendael, The Consequences of Schumacker and Wielockx: Two
steps Forward in the Tax Procession of Echternach, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 255, 263-265
(1996); PeterJ. Wattel, The EC Court's Attempts to Reconcile the Treaty Freedoms with Interna-
tional Tax Law, 33 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 223, 223-31 (1996).
49. See generally Safir v. Skattemyndigheten i Dalarnas Ln, Case C-118/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-1897.
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held that for Sweden to impose a different tax regime for insur-
ance policies purchased from providers outside Sweden, which
would have the effect of deterring Swedish residents from taking
out such policies, even though it was intended to achieve tax
neutrality between policies purchased inside and outside Swe-
den, was a breach of Article 49, and that since it concerned the
provision of services, there was no need to consider the capital
movement provisions. Such an approach is difficult to reconcile
with the wording of the Treaty-though it may be suggested that
the wording of the Treaty is hardly appropriate in the context of
the fifteen States sharing a single currency-but it was subse-
quently followed in Rolf Dieter Danner.5' The Grand Chamber
has rationalized this in Fidium Finanz AG v. Bundesanstalt fir
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,51 where it held that the residual na-
ture of "services" under Article 50 is a matter of definition, and
does not establish an order of priority between services and capi-
tal. However, it seems to accept that the same national measure
may relate to services and capital at the same time, but it will in
principle consider a measure in relation to only one of those
freedoms if it appears that one of them is entirely secondary in
relation to the other.
Be that as it may, earlier case law on services had indicated
that differentiation on the basis of place of investment might be
justified. In Bachmann v. Kingdom of Belgium, 2 the Court held
that tax deductions on life and sickness insurance premiums
could be limited to payments made to insurers established in
Belgium, on the basis that there was no other way of preserving
the coherence of the tax system (which required tax to be paid
on the ultimate benefits). It might be observed that if a require-
ment that a provider of a financial service should be established
within the jurisdiction of the Member State concerned really was
the only way of ensuring that a Member State's tax legislation is
observed, it indicated a need for a considerably greater degree
of cooperation between the tax authorities of the Member
States. It also had the effect of making provision of services, in
the Treaty sense, impossible.
50. See generally Rolf Dieter Danner, Case C-136/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8147.
51. See generally Fidium Finanz AG v. Bundesanstalt fdir Finanzdienstleistungsauf-
sicht, Case C-452/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-9521.
52. See generally Bachmann v. Belgium, Case C-204/90, [1992] E.C.R. 1-249.
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However, that was not the end of the story. The Court of
Justice returned to the matter in Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe
Belastingen.53 This involved a Belgian national resident in
Belgium who was a partner in a business established in the
Netherlands and whose entire income was earned in the Nether-
lands. He paid money into a pension reserve in the Nether-
lands, and claimed tax relief on that part of his income. This
was refused on the basis that relief was only given to Dutch re-
sidents, and the Netherlands government invoked the Bachmann
case to argue that in the case of a Belgian resident, the Nether-
lands authorities would grant the tax relief on the pension con-
tributions but the Belgian authorities would collect the tax on
the pension when it was received. However, the Court, while ac-
cepting that in principle the situations of residents and non-re-
sidents are not generally comparable, held that a non-resident
taxpayer who receives all or almost all his income in the state
where he works is objectively in the same situation as concerns
income tax as a resident of that state. Furthermore, on the ques-
tion of tax cohesion, the Court followed Advocate-General L~ger
in noting that the arrangements between the Netherlands and
Belgium resulted from a double taxation convention following
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") model under which a state taxes all pensions, irre-
spective of their source, received by residents, but waives the
right to tax pensions received abroad, irrespective of their
source. It therefore held that tax cohesion was to be established
not at the level of one individual taxpayer but in the reciprocity
of the rules applicable in the Contracting States. The Nether-
lands could not therefore justify a discriminatory refusal of tax
relief in this case.
While subsequent case law has continued to make reference
to Bachmann as authority for the principle that the need to safe-
guard the cohesion of the tax system may justify rules which are
liable to restrict fundamental freedoms, there has in fact been
no subsequent example of such discriminatory tax treatment be-
ing held to be justified. Indeed, in Danner, it was held that co-
herence of the tax system did not justify a Finnish refusal to
grant tax relief to a Finnish taxpayer on pension contributions
53. See generally Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen, Case C-80/94,
[1995) E.C.R. 1-2493.
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paid in Germany-facts which appear to be very similar to those
at issue in Bachmann.
With regard to the overlap with freedom of establishment,
there is a long line of case law indicating that differential tax
treatment based on residence or place of investment may in-
fringe on Article 43 EC.54 In the context of freedom of establish-
ment, if an undertaking does establish a permanent presence in
another Member State, then whatever form that establishment
takes, it has been clear since de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministre de
l'tconomie, des Finances et de l'Industrie, that Member States may
not treat companies differently for tax purposes depending on
the type of establishment present within theirjurisdiction. It was
there held, in the context of French legislation granting share-
holders' tax credits to French insurance companies but not to
branches or agencies in France of foreign insurance companies,
that France could not treat branches of foreign insurance com-
panies whose main offices were in other Member States differ-
ently from those insurance companies which took the form of
French-based companies which were subsidiaries of those for-
eign insurance companies. In other words, branches (which are
a part of the foreign undertaking in another Member State) and
subsidiaries (which are formed under local law but controlled by
the foreign undertaking) had to be treated the same way, both
being forms of establishment recognized in what is now Article
43 EC. Furthermore, it was made clear in that case that there
was no way restrictions could be imposed on the freedom of es-
tablishment in order to prevent tax evasion.5"
When the question of different treatment on the basis of
residence did arise in the context of freedom of establishment in
Queen v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Commerzbank A G,56
it was held that a German company which traded in the U.K.
through a branch established there but which was fiscally non-
resident in the U.K., was entitled to receive interest on the repay-
54. See, e.g., Metallgesellschaft & Hoechst v. Inland Revenue & H.M. Attorney
Gen., Joined Cases C-397/98 & C-410/98, (2001] E.C.R. 1-1727; C. Baars v. Inspecteur
der Belastingen Particulerien, Case C-251/98, [2000] E.C.RI 1-2787; Queen v. Inland
Revenue Comm'rs ex parte Commerzbank AG (Commerzbank), Case C-330/91, [1993]
E.C.R. 1-4017.
55. See generally de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Minist6re de '11conomie, des Finances et
de l'Industrie, Case C-9/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-2409.
56. Seegenerally Commenbank, Case C-330/91, [1993) E.C.R. 1-4017.
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ment of tax which should not have been charged to it, if an un-
dertaking resident in the U.K. would have received interest on
such a repayment-and it made no difference that the only rea-
son for the repayment of the tax was the fact that the German
company was not resident in the U.K. A similar approach has
been taken in Imperial Chemical Industries v. Colmer,57 where tax
relief for a holding company depended on the residence of its
subsidiaries. Subsequently, in Baars, 58 it was held that Dutch leg-
islation which gave an exemption from wealth tax for Dutch re-
sidents with a controlling shareholding in a company established
in the Netherlands but did not give that exemption for a control-
ling shareholding in a company established in another Member
State (in that case Ireland), breached the Treaty rules on free-
dom of establishment, and in Metallgesellschaft & Hoechst, the
subjection of the payment of dividends by a subsidiary company
to a parent company resident in another Member State to ad-
vance corporation tax when no advance corporation tax was re-
quired on payments of dividend to a parent company resident in
the U.K. was held to be a breach of the Treaty rules on freedom
of establishment.
A further step has been taken by the Grand Chamber in its
judgment in Marks & Spencer, PLC v. Halsey59 in the context of
freedom of establishment. The case involved U.K. rules on
group tax relief under which relief was only allowed for losses
incurred in the United Kingdom, whereas Marks & Spencer
wished to set off losses incurred by its subsidiaries in Belgium,
Germany and France. The ECJ accepted that in principle the
U.K. rules were a justified restriction on freedom of establish-
ment in so far as they were intended to protect a balanced allo-
cation of the power to impose taxation between the various
Member States concerned, to avoid the risk of the double use of
losses, and to avoid the risk of tax avoidance which would exist if
the losses were not taken into account in the subsidiaries' Mem-
ber States (the ECJ took the view that within a group of compa-
nies, losses might be transferred to the companies established in
the Member States which apply the highest rates of taxation and
in which the tax value of the losses is therefore the highest).
57. See generally Imperial Chem. Indus. v. Colmer, Case C-264/96, [1998] E.C.R. I-
4695.
58. See Baars, [2000] E.C.R 1-2787, 43.
59. See Marks & Spencer PLC v. Halsey, Case 446/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-10837, 61.
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However, the ECJ also considered that the U.K. rules would be
disproportionately restrictive where the non-resident subsidiary
had exhausted the possibilities available in its State of residence
of having the losses taken into account in its State of residence
for the relevant accounting periods, and there was no possibility
for the foreign subsidiary's losses to be taken into account in its
State of residence for future periods either by the subsidiary it-
self or by a third party, in particular where the subsidiary had
been sold to that third party. The ECJ therefore concluded that
where in one Member State the resident parent company dem-
onstrates to the tax authorities that those conditions are fulfilled,
it is contrary to freedom of establishment to preclude the possi-
bility for the parent company to deduct from its taxable profits
in that Member State the losses incurred by its non-resident sub-
sidiary.
Moving from deduction of losses made by a foreign subsidi-
ary to taxation of a foreign subsidiary, Cadbury Schweppes PLC v.
Commissioners of Inland Revenue6' involved the taxation of "con-
trolled foreign companies" under U.K. legislation. U.K. compa-
nies were taxed on their own worldwide profits (including agen-
cies and branches), but not on the profits of subsidiaries unless
they are "controlled foreign companies", i.e. subject in their
State of establishment to a lower level of taxation, subject to a
series of exceptions and a "motive" test. The case involved sub-
sidiaries set up to take advantage of the low tax rates of the Dub-
lin International Financial Services Centre. It was held that seek-
ing to take advantage of lower tax rates cannot deprive a com-
pany of its Treaty rights, and the U.K. rules breached Articles 43
and 48 on freedom of establishment unless they could be justi-
fied in relation to "wholly artificial arrangements." It was held
that arrangements would not be artificial if there was an actual
establishment and pursuit of a genuine economic activity. How-
ever, neither an objective of obtaining tax relief or the fact that
the work could have been done in the home State made the ac-
tivity wholly artificial.
With regard to free movement of workers, in Finanzamt
60. See Cadbury Schweppes PLC v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Case 196/
04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-7995, 1 76.
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Kdln-Altstadt v. Schumacke 1 and Commission v. Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg,62 it was made clear that discrimination cannot be
justified where the taxpayer benefits from the rules on free
movement of workers, and in Asscher v. Staatssecretaris van
Financin,6 it was made clear that discrimination cannot be justi-
fied where the taxpayer benefits from the rules on freedom of
establishment. In the Schumacker case, it was held that where the
state of residence could not take account of the taxpayer's per-
sonal and family circumstances because the tax payable there
was insufficient to enable it to do so, the Community principle of
equal treatment required that in the state of employment the
personal and family circumstances of a foreign non-resident be
taken into account in the same way as those of resident nation-
als, and the same tax benefits should be granted. In Commission
v. Luxembourg, it was held that it was a breach of the rules on the
free movement of workers for Luxembourg to retain and not
repay excess amounts of tax deducted from the earnings of Com-
munity nationals who resided or worked in Luxembourg for less
than the whole tax year; and in Asscher, the Netherlands could
not impose a higher income tax liability on a non-resident to
compensate for the fact that he paid social security contributions
in another Member State. On the other hand, it was accepted by
the Court of Justice in Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-
Rhin6 4 that a frontier worker may have to accept less than perfect
equality of treatment under a double taxation agreement.
On the face of it, there is, therefore, a conflict between the
Treaty rights of freedom of establishment, freedom to provide
services and free movement of workers as interpreted in Com-
merzbank, Wielockx, Schumacker, Commission v. Luxembourg and Ass-
cher, and Article 58(1) (a) EC if it really does authorize discrimi-
natory tax treatment. The problem however was eventually re-
solved by the Court in the judgment of its Grand Chamber in
Manninen6 5 through a strict interpretation of Article 58(1) (a)
61. See Finanzamt K61n-Altstadt v. Schumacker, Case 279/93, [1995] E.C.R. 1-225,
60.
62. See Commission v. Luxembourg, Case 151/94, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3685, 12.
63. See Asscher v. Staatssecretaris van Financidn, Case 107/94, (1996] E.C.R. I-
3089, 65.
64. See Gilly v. Directeur des Services Fiscaux du Bas-Rhin, Case 336/96, [1998]
E.C.R. 1-2793, 55.
65. See Petri Manninen, Case C-319/02, [2004] E.C.R. 1-7477, 29.
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read in conjunction with the prohibition of arbitrary discrimina-
tion in Article 58(3). This approach had been foreshadowed in
Verkooijen,6 6 where the Court suggested that Article 58(1) (a) had
been anticipated by its judgment in Bachmann and that before its
entry into force, distinctions based on the residence of taxpayers
would be compatible with Community law if they applied to situ-
ations which were not objectively comparable or could be justi-
fied by overriding reasons in the public interest, in particular in
relation to the cohesion of the tax system; it was emphasized that
a desire to promote the domestic economy by encouraging do-
mestic investment could not be such an overriding interest, nor
could a loss of tax revenue.
The Manninen case arose from the refusal of the Finnish
authorities to grant a Finnish taxpayer a tax credit in relation to
dividend received from a Swedish company, which had been
taxed in Sweden, when such a credit would have been granted
on a dividend received from a Finnish company taxed in Fin-
land. In principle, the Court held this to be a restriction on the
free movement of capital prohibited by Article 56 EC, on the
basis that the Finnish tax legislation had the effect of deterring
fully taxable persons in Finland from investing their capital in
companies established in another Member State. It also found
that such a provision had a restrictive effect as regards compa-
nies established in other Member States, in that it constituted an
obstacle to their raising capital in Finland: since revenue from
capital of non-Finnish origin received less favorable tax treat-
ment than dividends distributed by companies established in
Finland, the shares of companies established in other Member
States would be less attractive to investors residing in Finland
than shares in companies which had their seat in that Member
State.
The Court then turned to the question whether this restric-
tion was capable of being justified under Article 58(1) (a). It
started by observing that this provision had to be interpreted
strictly, as a derogation from the fundamental principle of the
free movement of capital, and that it "cannot be interpreted as
meaning that any tax legislation making a distinction between
taxpayers by reference to the place where they invest their capi-
66. SeeVerkooijen, Case C-35-98, [2000] E.C.R. 1-407, 1 57. It should be noted that
the facts in this case arose before the entry into force of Article 58(1)(a).
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tal is automatically compatible with the Treaty."6v It emphasised
that a distinction must therefore be made between unequal
treatment, which is permitted under Article 58(1) (a), and arbi-
trary discrimination, which is prohibited by Article 58(3), and
stated that its case law showed that, for national tax legislation
like that at issue to be capable of being regarded as compatible
with the Treaty provisions on the free movement of capital, the
difference in treatment must concern situations which are not
objectively comparable or be justified by overriding reasons in
the general interest, such as the need to safeguard the cohesion
of the tax system. The Court also added a proportionality test, as
under the other "freedoms," stating that in order to be justified,
the difference in treatment between different categories of divi-
dends must not go beyond what was necessary in order to attain
the objective of the legislation.
Observations had been submitted by the Finnish, French
and United Kingdom governments, which argued that the divi-
dends paid were fundamentally different in character according
to whether they came from Finnish or non-Finnish companies.
However, the Court took the view that the Finnish tax legislation
was designed to prevent double taxation of company profits by
granting to a shareholder who receives dividends a tax advantage
linked to the taking into account of the corporation tax due
from the company distributing the dividends, and that share-
holders fully taxable in Finland found themselves in a compara-
ble situation, whether they received dividends from companies
established in that Member State or from companies established
in other Member States.
The three governments further argued that the Finnish tax
legislation was objectively justified by the need to ensure the co-
hesion of the national tax system, citing Bachmann. In this con-
text, the Court explained its judgment in Bachmann on the basis
that it had acknowledged that the need to preserve the cohesion
of a tax system might justify a restriction on the exercise of the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. However, for
an argument based on such justification to succeed, a direct link
had to be established between the tax advantage concerned and
the offsetting of that advantage by a particular tax deduction,
and it declared that the Bachmann judgment was based on the
67. See Manninen, [2004] E.C.R. 1-7477, 28.
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finding that, in Belgian law, there was a direct link, in relation to
the same taxpayer liable to income tax, between the ability to
deduct insurance contributions from taxable income and the
subsequent taxation of sums paid by the insurers. The Court
also emphasized that an argument based on the need to safe-
guard the cohesion of a tax system must be examined in the
light of the objective pursued by the tax legislation in question,6"
repeating that the Finnish tax legislation was designed to pre-
vent double taxation of company profits distributed to share-
holders. In this context, it concluded that the granting to a
shareholder who was fully taxable in Finland and who held
shares in a company established in Sweden of a tax credit calcu-
lated by reference to the corporation tax owed by that company
in Sweden would not threaten the cohesion of the Finnish tax
system, pointing out that when the shareholder fully taxable in
Finland received dividends, the profits distributed had already
been subject to taxation by way of corporation tax, irrespective
of whether those dividends come from Finnish or from Swedish
companies. Therefore the objective pursued by the Finnish tax
legislation, which was to eliminate the double taxation of profits
distributed in the form of dividends, could be achieved by also
granting the tax credit in favor of profits distributed in that way
by Swedish companies to persons fully taxable in Finland.
The Court recognized that for Finland, granting a tax credit
in relation to corporation tax due in another Member State
would entail a reduction in its tax receipts in relation to divi-
dends paid by companies in other Member States, but it pointed
out that it had been consistently held in the case-law that reduc-
tion in tax revenue cannot be regarded as an overriding reason
in the public interest which may be relied on to justify a measure
which is in principle contrary to a fundamental freedom.69
The Court's ruling therefore was that Articles 56 and 58 EC
preclude legislation whereby the entitlement of a person fully
taxable in one Member State to a tax credit in relation to divi-
dends paid to him by limited companies is excluded where those
companies are not established in that state. Interpreted in this
68. See de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministre de l'lconomie, des Finances et de
'Industrie, Case C-9/02 [2004] E.C.R. 1-2409, 1 64, 67.
69. See Rolf Dieter Danner, Case C-136/00, [2002] E.C.R. 1-8147, 56; Verkooijen,
[2000] E.C.R. 1-4071, 59.
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way, it may be suggested that there is little real prospect of a
difference in treatment of tax discrimination under Article
58(1) (a) and its treatment under the rules governing freedom to
provide services, freedom of establishment and free movement
of workers, where the taxpayers concerned can be regarded as
being in a comparable situation.
However, the Court has made it clear in Kerckhaert v.
Belgische Staat7 ° that the capital movement rules will only be
breached by national tax legislation if there is discrimination,
and it is not enough that there is a deterrent effect on free move-
ment: thus a refusal by Belgium to grant a tax credit to a Belgian
taxpayer for tax paid in France on a dividend on shares in a
French company did not breach the capital movement rules if
no tax credits would have been given in respect of dividends
paid by a Belgian company (even if the reason was that no tax
would have been deducted at source, since dividends in Belgium
were taxed as income). Indeed it has been argued that in the
context of all the Treaty freedoms, national tax legislation will
only breach the Treaty if it is discriminatory in its effect.71 Some
recent case law will give an overview of the extent to which differ-
ential tax treatment is or is not permitted in EC law on the basis
of residence. Discrimination on the grounds of residence raises
more difficult issues, since residence is a common connecting
factor in tax systems. However, in Centro di Musicologia Walter
Stauffer v. ZA Miinchen7 2 it was held that Germany had to give
resident treatment to an Italian charitable foundation. The Ital-
ian foundation owned commercial premises in Munich, and the
question arose whether it should be taxed on its rental income
when a German charitable foundation would be exempt. This
was treated as a question of free movement of capital in that it
involved investment in real estate. It was held that if the founda-
tion met the local requirements for charitable status, it could not
be denied equal treatment, though Germany was entitled to as-
certain in a precise manner whether the foundation met those
conditions. In response to one German argument, it was ex-
pressly stated that there cannot be a general assumption of crim-
70. See Kerckhaert v. Belgische Staat, Case C-513/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-10967, 1 17.
71. See Jukka Snell, Non-discriminatory Tax Obstacles in Community Law, 56 IN'r'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 339, 339-45 (2007).
72. Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v. Finanzamt Manchen for K6rper-
schaften, Case C-386/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-8203.
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inal activity if a foundation is established in another Member
State!
On the other hand, differential treatment was accepted in
D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen
buitenland te Heerlen.7" This concerned a Dutch wealth tax im-
posed on the worldwide assets of Dutch residents, and on the
Dutch assets of non-residents, but subject to a tax-free allowance
for residents. D. was a German resident who had invested in
Dutch real estate (and therefore fell within the capital move-
ment rules), and who claimed that he should receive the allow-
ance given to Dutch residents. However, it was held that re-
sidents taxed on their worldwide assets and non-residents taxed
only on their Dutch assets are not in a comparable situation, and
it was not a breach of the capital movement rules not to grant
the allowance to someone who only had a small part of his
wealth in the Netherlands. It was also held that the special treat-
ment accorded to Belgian residents under a double taxation
agreement did not need to be extended to residents of Member
States not party to that convention.
In N. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo,
N. moved from the Netherlands to the U.K, which constituted a
notional (and taxable) disposal of his shares under Dutch law.
Since it was a substantial shareholding it was held to fall under
the establishment rules, and in principle it was held to be disad-
vantageous treatment compared to a resident.74 However, it was
also held to be justified as allocating between Member States, on
the basis of territoriality, the power to tax increases of value in
company holdings. Nevertheless, it also involved an obligation
to give a guarantee, which was held to go beyond what was neces-
sary, and full account was not taken of reductions in value.
In Blanckaert v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/
Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen,7 Blanckaert owned a holiday
home in the Netherlands, thus falling within the capital move-
ment rules, and giving rise to a tax liability. He claimed the tax
credit available to Dutch residents in relation to national insur-
73. D. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondememingen buiten-
land te Heerlen, Case C-376/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5821.
74. See N. v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Almelo, Case C-470/
04, [2006] E.C.R_ 1-7409, 35, 41, 51, 55.
75. See Blanckaert v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernem-
ingen buitenland te Heerlen, Case C-512/03, [2005] E.C.R. 1-7685, 50.
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ance contributions, although as a non-resident he was not so in-
sured. It was held that there was an objective difference between
those insured and those not insured under the Dutch scheme.
Finally, in FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH v. Finanzamt
Hamburg-Eimsbuettel, it was accepted by the Grand Chamber that
the services rules do not preclude retention of tax at source on
payments made to non-resident providers of services, though
they did require that business expenses could be deducted from
the tax retained when resident service providers could deduct
business expenses from their tax liability-but the services rules
could not be invoked by a national of a non-Member State,
which leads on to a discussion of the third-country effects of the
capital movement rules.7 6
VI. CAPITAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD COUNTRIES
As mentioned earlier in this Article, serious legal issues arise
from the classification as a capital movement of an economic
activity which might otherwise be regarded as a service; a similar
need for clarification was seen to arise in the relationship be-
tween free movement of capital and freedom of establishment.
There is therefore clear potential for overlap with other Treaty
freedoms and the question then arises as to whether the current
capital movement provisions effectively extend the other free-
doms to third country nationals or residents. It does not take
much imagination to envisage the possible consequences of this
approach to the capital movement provisions if, for example,
they are interpreted broadly so as to include activities which
might economically be regarded as the provision of services
(such as the provision of mortgage credit or of guarantees).
Does it mean that a borrower resident in the Community has an
enforceable Community law right to take out a mortgage with a
provider in a third country, and does it mean that a lender in a
third country has an enforceable Community law right to offer a
mortgage to a borrower in a Member State? Conversely, does it
mean that a lender in the Community has an enforceable Com-
munity law right to offer a mortgage to a borrower in a third
country, and that a borrower in a third country has an enforcea-
ble Community law right to take out a mortgage with a provider
76. See FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen GmbH v. Finanzamt Hamburg-Eim-
sbuettel (FKP Scorpio), Case C-290/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-9461, 70.2.
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in the Community (and therefore presumably the right to enter
the Community for that purpose)? It is in this context that the
relevance of Article 57 EC may be seen. Under Article 57, the
provisions of Article 56 are stated to be without prejudice to the
application to third countries of any restrictions which existed
on December 31, 1993 under national or Community law
adopted in respect of the movement of capital to or from third
countries involving direct investment (including investment in
real estate), establishment, the provision of financial services or
the admission of securities to capital markets; in other words,
they do not require pre-1994 lawful restrictions to be abolished
in these areas which, apart from direct investment, expressly
overlap with freedom of establishment and freedom to provide
services. It may in fact be suggested that the very wording of this
provision implies that those who drafted it were influenced in
their concept of capital movements by the nomenclature An-
nexed to the 1988 Directive, and expected that these definitions
could apply in the context of capital movements to and from
third countries.
It is also the case that there are other restrictions limited to
third countries. Under Article 59, where, in exceptional circum-
stances, movements of capital to or from third countries cause,
or threaten to cause, serious difficulties for the operation of eco-
nomic and monetary union, the Council, acting by a qualified
majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consult-
ing the European Central Bank, may take safeguard measures
with regard to third countries for a period not exceeding six
months if such measures are strictly necessary. Finally, by virtue
of Article 60, the Council may take urgent measures under Arti-
cle 301, where Community action to interrupt or reduce eco-
nomic relations with one or more third countries is required by
a common position or in ajoint action adopted under the Euro-
pean Union provisions on a common foreign and security policy,
in relation to the movement of capital and on payments as re-
gard the third countries concerned; indeed, pending such mea-
sures, Member States themselves may, under the second para-
graph of Article 60, take unilateral measures against a third
country with regard to capital movements and payments "for se-
rious political reasons.""7 The freedom is therefore not abso-
77. EC Treaty, supra note 25, art. 60(1), O.J. C 321 E/37, at E/65.
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lute.
Be that as it may, to the extent that a payment or capital
movement is not excluded, Article 56 has been held to be di-
rectly effective even with regard to capital movements to third
countries such as Switzerland and Turkey.78 This in itself is an
interesting development, given the Court's reluctance in earlier
case-law automatically to extend concepts developed in the con-
text of the internal market to situations governed by similar lan-
guage in relations with third countries. So, for example, in
Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Records Shops Ltd.,7 in the context of the
free movement of goods, it was held that even where a free trade
agreement does expressly prohibit not only quantitative restric-
tions but also measures having effects equivalent to quantitative
restrictions, the same interpretation of that phrase need not be
given in the context of trade with a non-Member State as will be
given in the context of trade between States, since there is no
intention to create a single market under free trade agreements.
A synthesis of the approach to the direct effect of provisions
of international agreements was given in the context of an agree-
ment between the Community and Portugal in the Hauptzollamt
Mainz v. C. A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A.80 The Court started from
the principle that it is open to the Community and the third
country to agree what effect the provisions of the agreement are
to have in the internal legal order of the contracting parties, and
that the matter fell to be decided by the courts only in the ab-
sence of express agreement on the point, emphasizing however
that it was open to the courts of one contracting party to con-
sider that certain provisions were directly effective even if that
view was not shared by courts of the other contracting party. It
then went on to consider whether the provision at issue could be
regarded as unconditional and sufficiently precise to have direct
effect in the light of the object and purpose of the agreement,
concluding that the provision at issue imposed an unconditional
rule against discrimination in matters of taxation, dependent
78. See generally Criminal Proceedings Against Lucas Emilio Sanz de Lera, Rai-
mundo DiazJimenez & Figen Kapanoglu, Joined Cases 163, 165, 250/94, [1995] E.C.R.
1-4821.
79. Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Records Shops Ltd., Case 270/80, [1982] E.C.R. I-
329.
80. See generally Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C. A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A.,
(Kupferberg) Case 104/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1-3641.
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only on a finding that the products affected were of like nature,
so that it could be applied by a court and produce direct effects
throughout the Community. The Court did emphasize, how-
ever, that despite the fact that the provision at issue had the
same object as Article 95 (now Article 90) EC, each of these pro-
visions should be interpreted in its own context, and that the
interpretation given to Article 90 could not be applied by way of
simple analogy to the corresponding provision of an agreement
on free trade. However, in Sanz de Lera, the judgment does not
discuss these issues, and simply holds Article 56 to be directly
effective in itself and on its own terms.
Leaving aside the specific restrictions, the question which
arises is whether the broad concept of capital movements over-
lapping with other Treaty freedoms, and in particular the case
law on taxation, applies to transactions with third country trad-
ers and residents. The question did begin to surface in the deci-
sion of the Grand Chamber in Fidium Finanz,1 which involved a
Swiss firm offering credit on the internet into Germany. The
Court expressly noted the difference between the capital move-
ment rules and the services rules with regard to third country
providers, but accepted that the activity of granting credit on a
commercial basis concerns both the freedom to provide services
and the free movement of capital. However, it took the view that
the German rules at issue, which related to authorization of fi-
nancial service undertakings and required a permanent estab-
lishment (therefore by definition breaching the services rules)
should be categorized as restrictions of the freedom to provide
services-which could not be invoked by a Swiss company (at the
time the facts occurred). It further held that any restriction on
free movement of capital was "merely an unavoidable conse-
quence of the restriction on the freedom to provide services,"
and therfore did not decide the third-country point.8 2 Similarly
in FKP Scorpio, it was accepted by the Grand Chamber that the
services rules do not preclude retention of tax at source on pay-
ments made to non-resident providers of services, though they
did require that business expenses could be deducted from the
tax retained when resident service providers could deduct busi-
81. Fidium Finanz AG v. Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Case C-
452/04, [2006] E.C.R. 3641, 43, 46, 48.
82. Id. 48.
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ness expenses from their tax liability-but the services rules
could not be invoked by a national of a non-Member State. 3
With regard to the overlap between capital movements and
freedom of establishment, it was pointed out by the Grand
Chamber in relation to U.K. tax legislation in Test Claimants in
the Thin Cap Group Litigation v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue
that:
Article 43 EC has no bearing on ... a situation in which both
the lending company and the common parent company are
resident in a non-member country, nor does it have any bear-
ing on a situation in which a lending company which is resi-
dent in another Member State and does not itself control the
borrowing company grants the loan through a branch estab-
lished in a non-member country, where the common parent
company is also resident in a non-member country. 84
However the application of the capital movement rules in
relation to tax issues involving third countries was considered by
the Grand Chamber in Skatteverket v. A."5 This involved Swedish
legislation which gave a tax exemption (subject to a number of
specific conditions) for dividends distributed in the form of
shares in a subsidiary. This tax exemption applied initially to
profits distributed by Swedish companies, and was later ex-
tended to the distribution of shares by a foreign company which
corresponds to a Swedish limited liability company and is estab-
lished in a State within the European Economic Area ("EEA") 6
or in a State with which the Kingdom of Sweden has concluded a
tax convention that contains a provision on exchange of infor-
mation. The case, however, involved a proposed distribution by
a Swiss company (Switzerland not being in the EEA), and in an-
swering the questions put by the Swedish court, the Grand
Chamber expressly considered both the scope of Article 56 in
the context of transactions with third countries, and the restric-
tions that might be imposed under Articles 57 and 58.
83. FKP Scorpio, Case C-290/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-9461, 70.1.
84. Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litig. v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue,
Case C-524/04, [2007] E.C.R. 1-2107, 1 100.
85. Skatteverket v. A., Case C-101/05, [2007] E.C.R. _ (ECJ Dec. 18, 2007)
(LEXIS, Eurcom Library, Cases File).
86. The European Economic Area ("EEA") comprises the European Union
("EU") plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. See Eur. Free Trade Assoc., Introduc-
tion, http:secretariat.efta.int/Web/EuropeanEconomicArea/introduction (last visited
Apr. 8, 2008).
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The Grand Chamber recognized that in Criminal Proceedings
Against Lucas Emilio Sanz de Lera, Raimundo Diaz Jimenez & Figen
Kapanoglu, the Court had recognized the direct effect of Article
56(1) EC, without drawing a distinction between the categories
of capital movement which are covered by Article 57(1) EC and
those which are not so covered, and repeated that Article 56(1)
EC, in conjunction with Articles 57 EC and 58 EC, may be relied
on before national courts and may render national rules that are
inconsistent with it inapplicable, irrespective of the category of
capital movement in question. It stated expressly that:
[E]ven if the liberalisation of the movement of capital with
third countries may pursue objectives other than that of es-
tablishing the internal market, such as, in particular, that of
ensuring the credibility of the single Community currency on
world financial markets and maintaining financial centres
with a world-wide dimension within the Member States, it is
clear that, when the principle of free movement of capital was
.extended, pursuant to Article 56(1) EC, to movement of capi-
tal between third countries and the Member States, the latter
chose to enshrine that principle in that article and in the
same terms for movements of capital taking place within the
Community and those relating to relations with third coun-
tries.
8 7
Rather, the way in which account was taken of the fact that the
objective and the legal context of the liberalization of the move-
ment of capital differ according to whether relations between
the Member States and third countries or the free movement of
capital between the Member States is in issue, was through the
safeguard clauses and derogations which apply specifically to the
movement of capital to or from third countries, and through the
way in which Article 58 is interpreted in cases involving third
countries. Furthermore, the Grand Chamber accepted that a
Member State may be able to demonstrate that a restriction on
the movement of capital to or from third countries is justified for
a particular reason in circumstances where that reason would
not constitute a valid justification for a restriction on capital
movements between Member States.
Turning to the facts of the case, the Grand Chamber noted
that the effect of the Swedish legislation was to discourage tax-
87. Skatteverket, [2007] E.C.R. _, 31 (LEXIS).
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payers residing in Sweden from investing their capital in compa-
nies established outside the EEA, and that this entailed a restric-
tion of the movement of capital between Member States and
third countries which, in principle, was prohibited by Article
56(1) EC. It then considered whether the dividends related to
"direct investments" under Article 57(1), in relation to which
Sweden could maintain restrictions which had been in force in
1993, declaring that a restriction on capital movements consist-
ing of a less favorable tax treatment of foreign-sourced dividends
is covered by the concept of "direct investment" under Article
57(1) EC in so far as it relates to investments of any kind under-
taken by natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or
maintain lasting and direct links between the persons providing
the capital and the undertakings to which that capital is made
available in order to carry out an economic activity-reflecting
the case law on the nomenclature attached to the 1988 Directive.
While leaving determination of that question for the Swedish
court, in the absence of any relevant findings of fact, the Grand
Chamber did accept that the Swedish rules could be regarded as
having continued in force since the end of 1993.
Dealing next with the general restrictions on the free move-
ment of capital which can be justified under Article 58, the
Grand Chamber considered whether there was a justification for
giving the tax exemption to distributions by companies outside
the EEA only where they were established in a State with which
the Kingdom of Sweden has concluded a tax convention that
contains a provision on exchange of information. Here it noted
that although it had been frequently held, with regard to na-
tional legislation restricting the exercise of one of the freedoms,
that a Member State cannot rely on the fact that it may be impos-
sible to seek cooperation from another Member State in con-
ducting inquiries or collecting information in order to justify a
refusal to grant a tax advantage, "that case-law, which relates to
restrictions on the exercise of freedom of movement within the
Community, cannot be transposed in its entirety to movements
of capital between Member States and third countries, since
such movements take place in a different legal context."88
The conclusion therefore was that:
Where the legislation of a Member State makes the grant of a
88. Id. 60.
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tax advantage dependent on satisfying requirements, compli-
ance with which can be verified only by obtaining informa-
tion from the competent authorities of a third country, it is,
in principle, legitimate for that Member State to refuse to
grant that advantage if, in particular, because that third coun-
try is not under any contractual obligation to provide infor-
mation, it proves impossible to obtain such information from
that country.
89
The situation with regard to capital movements involving third
countries may therefore be said to be that the basic liberalization
under Article 56 applies in the same way as it does inside the EC,
but subject to the special restrictions permitted under Article 57,
and subject to a possible difference in interpretation of the pub-
lic policy requirements of Article 58.
CONCLUSION
As was indicated at the outset of this Article, the rules gov-
erning monetary movements represent a unique evolution of
regulatory technique from detailed secondary legislation to di-
rectly effective Treaty principle. However, the definitions of cap-
ital movements and payments created in the context of liberali-
zation by secondary legislation have been continued into the era
of directly effective Treaty provisions on freedom of capital
movements. While those definitions were created in the context
of rules which applied only within the internal market, they are
now being applied in the context of rules on the free movement
of capital which are unique (in the context of EC Treaty free-
doms) in that they are not limited to the internal market. Fur-
thermore, these definitions have a clear potential for overlap
with other Treaty freedoms, notably freedom to provide services
and freedom of establishment, with intriguing (and unresolved)
consequences for the relationship of free movement of capital to
other Treaty freedoms. In particular, the question is raised as to
whether, under the guise of free movement of capital, a third
country economic operator may offer services or exercise free-
dom of establishment within the EC. Many such activities would
clearly be subject to the restrictions permitted in Article 57 of
the EC Treaty, but such restrictions depend on the substantive
scope of national law rather than Community law. Even within
89. Id. 63.
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the internal market of the EC, the broad definitions of capital
movements have blurred the distinctions between the freedoms,
and the European Court has found itself reinterpreting the hier-
archy of freedoms set out in the EC Treaty: in a way that is not
perhaps immediately obvious from the wording of Article 50 of
the Treaty, it has held that freedom to provide services is not
subordinate to the other freedoms, and that what matters for the
purposes of classification is the essential nature of the transac-
tion or situation. However, the Court has now resolved what had
been thought to be one of the most problematic aspects of this
overlap between the freedoms, the fact that the wording of Arti-
cle 58 on capital movements allows for tax discrimination on the
basis of the taxpayer's residence or on the basis of the place of
investment. If taken at face value this could have made the
achievement of a single market for financial services a legal im-
possibility, but following the judgment in Manninen, it now ap-
pears that the criteria for determining whether tax discrimina-
tion is justifiable in the context of free movement of capital are
comparable to those used in the context of freedom of establish-
ment, freedom to provide services and free movement of work-
ers. It may be suggested that this will lead to another incremen-
tal step in the development of the single internal market, requir-
ing Member States in some circumstances to take account of tax
paid in other Member States and to give tax relief for payments
made in other Member States. In this area, the internal market
is still on the move.
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